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SUBCONTRACTING CLAUSES AND SECTION S(e) OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
The addition of section 8(e)1 to the National Labor Relations Act2 in 
1959 jeopardized the validity of all subcontracting clauses-provisions in 
employer-union collective bargaining agreements which in some manner 
eliminate or condition the employer's right to contract out work or which 
penalize the exercise of that right.8 Although it was not the congressional 
1 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer 
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer 
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting 
or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing 
business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore 
or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void: 
Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor 
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or 
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, 
or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Provided further, That for the purposes 
of this subsection and section (b) the terms 'any employer,' 'any person engaged in com• 
merce or an industry affecting commerce,' and 'any person' when used in relation to the 
terms 'any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,' 'any other employer,' or 'any 
other person' shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, con• 
tractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer 
or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing 
industry: Provided further, That nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit the enforcement 
of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception." 73 Stat. 54!1 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(e) (Supp. IV, 196!1). 
2 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (Wagner Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958) (Taft-Hartley 
Act). 
8 One in every five major contracts now contains some kind of subcontracting clause. 
Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, 84 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 579 (1961). 
Actually, the number of contracts which in fact contain some restriction on subcontracting 
is considerably larger than this because of the recent practice of many arbitrators to infer 
a restriction on subcontracting from other terms in the contract. See Fayerweather, Implied 
Restrictions on Work Movements-The Pernicious Crow of Labor Contract Construction, 
38 NoTRE DAME LAW. 518 (1963). 
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intent that section S(e) indiscriminately abolish all subcontracting clauses,4 
this is the literal impact of the language used in the section. 
Congress formulated section S(e) in such a way as to condemn all 
clauses which cause secondary pressure to be applied to "unfair" employers 
for the purpose of compelling their acquiescence in various union demands.5 
These are popularly known as "hot cargo" clauses.6 Prior to the enactment 
of section S(e) it was common for a union to obtain a hot-cargo promise 
from each employer with whom it bargained to the effect that the employer 
would agree to cease or refrain from doing business with any employer 
whom the union might designate as "unfair.'' When such a promise was 
contained in the collective bargaining contracts of the customers or sup-
pliers of an employer involved in a labor dispute it provided a strong in-
ducement for him to settle his differences with the union in order to avoid 
being designated "unfair," with resultant loss of business from those cus-
tomers and suppliers. 
There were two basic reasons why Congress objected to the unions' use 
of this indirect or secondary pressure whereby a neutral employer is con-
tractually committed to apply pressure on the "unfair" employer for the 
union's benefit. First, the use of secondary pressure tends to enlarge the 
primary labor dispute between the union and the "unfair" employer by 
involving neutral employers in the controversy, thereby magnifying the dis-
ruptive effects of the altercation on the economy.7 Second, it is inequitable 
for a union to compel a neutral employer to become its forced ally in a 
foreign labor dispute and to require him to terminate a profitable or long-
standing business relationship even though the neutral employer may be 
sympathetic to the position of the "unfair" employer.8 
4 See notes 11, 14 infra. 
IS See Powell, The Impact of Section B(e) on Subcontracting Clauses in Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIS-
CLOSURE A.er OF 1959, at 897, 904 (Slovenko ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as SYMPOSIUM]. 
Speaking of a bill identical to 8(e) with the only exception that the construction and 
apparel industry provisos had not yet been added, Representative Griffin said, "[I]t is 
important to keep in mind that our substitute bill would not change-it would only 
reinforce what was the intent of Congress at the time it passed the Taft-Hartley Act. That 
intent was to outlaw secondary boycotts." 105 CONG. REc. 15531 (1959), 2 NLRB, LEGISLA· 
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959, at 1568 
(1959) [hereinafter cited as 1 or 2 LEcIS. HIST.]. 
6 The "hot-cargo clause" got its name from the fact that originally it was a clause 
which exempted employees from any obligation to handle goods which were viewed as 
"hot" because they came from "unfair" employers. As a practical matter, this clause 
usually forced the employer to cease dealing with the "unfair" employer and, consequently, 
this resulted in the application of pressure on the "unfair" employer to alter his labor 
policies to the satisfaction of the union in order again to become classified as a "fair" 
employer. This pressure applied to the "unfair" employer is called secondary pressure 
rather than primary pressure because it is exerted indirectly by another employer rather 
than directly by the union. See generally 3 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1f 5222. 
7 See Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Lithographers, 180 F. Supp. 294, 297 (N.D. Cal. 
1960). 
s See Los Angeles Mailers' Union 9, I.T.U. (Hillbro Newspaper Printing Co.), 135 
N.L.R.B. 1132, 1137 (1962). 
1178 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
The assault upon these secondary pressure tactics began in 1958 when 
the Supreme Court decided Sand Door.9 In that case it was held that, al-
though the presence of a hot-cargo clause in a contract was not per se illegal 
under the National Labor Relations Act, it was an unfair labor practice 
for a union to strike in order to force an unwilling employer to abide by a 
hot-cargo clause in his collective bargaining contract should he later decide 
to disregard that provision. Nevertheless, the hot-cargo clause still retained 
vitality because there remained at the union's disposal a variety of tech-
niques capable of convincing most neutral eip.ployers "voluntarily" to honor 
their contractual commitments to the unions.10 Therefore, Congress found 
it necessary to finish the task begun in Sand Door by declaring, through 
section S(e), that all hot-cargo contracts are totally void and that it is an 
unfair labor practice even to enter into such an agreement.11 
This congressional proscription of hot-cargo clauses encompasses some 
subcontracting clauses, because several varieties of subcontracting clauses can 
be used to exert secondary pressure on "unfair" employers, and as such they 
become hot-cargo clauses.12 However, other varieties of subcontracting 
clauses cannot be used to exert secondary pressure on "unfair" employers.13 
For example, a clause which is motivated solely by the union's desire to 
protect the jobs of its members in the bargaining unit, and which simply 
stipulates that no work shall be subcontracted away from the bargaining 
unit, has neither the purpose nor the effect of applying discriminatory 
secondary pressure upon outside "unfair" employers.14 Furthermore, this 
type of subcontracting clause has neither a tendency to magnify labor dis-
putes nor the capacity to involve neutral employers in them, because it 
operates independently of the union's current relations with other em-
ployers. These clauses seem clearly to fall beyond the congressional purpose 
underlying section S(e).15 
9 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). 
10 The desire of an employer to retain the confidence and trust of the union would 
incline him toward compliance with the clause. In addition, the threat of excessive 
demands by the union at the next bargaining session would be persuasive for many 
employers, particularly if the expiration date of the old contract is not far off. Finally, 
the failure to abide by this clause might be considered a material breach of the contract, 
which would terminate the old contract and require new negotiations with the union. 
11 See Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Lithographers, 180 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 
1960); Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 985 
(1962); 105 CONG. REc. 16590 (1959), 2 LEGIS. Hlsr. 1708 (remarks of Representative Thomp-
son); Rothman, Problems Raised by New Secondary-Boycott Restrictions, 45 L.R.R.M. 78 
(1960). 
12 See notes 94-100 infra and accompanying text for examples of this kind of clause. 
13 See Orange Belt Dist. Council v. NLRB, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (55 L.R.R.M.) 2293, 2296 
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 1964). 
14 For the argument that this kind of clause can not exert secondary pressure on 
"unfair" employers, see notes 72-74 infra and accompanying text. 
15 There is no advocacy for the abolition of subcontracting clauses in the entire re-
ported history of the Landrum-Griffin bill. Teamsters Union (Wilson &: Co.), 53 L.R.R.M. 
1475, 1483 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Member Brown); see Aaron, The Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1086, lll9 (1960). But cf. 
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However, a literal reading of section 8(e) seems to extend its proscrip-
tion considerably beyond that contemplated by Congress. Literally, section 
8(e) prohibits all agreements whereby an employer promises a union that 
he will cease or refrain from handling the products of any other employer 
or cease doing business with any other person. This censure is sufficiently 
comprehensive to encompass the entire spectrum of subcontracting clauses 
because, in some measure, each subcontracting clause requires the general 
employer to promise to cease or refrain from doing business with subcon-
tractors. Congress unfortunately relied upon this ambiguous characteristic 
-ceasing or refraining from doing business with another-to identify and 
convict the hot-cargo clause in section 8(e); consequently, the language of 
the section appears inadvertently to proscribe clauses used solely for job 
protection as well as clauses having illegal secondary objectives. 
This myopic draftsmanship prompted several writers to predict, at the 
time section 8(e) was enacted, that its passage had sounded the death knell 
for the subcontracting clause.16 Others, taking a contrary view, contended 
that section 8(e) should not be applied to those clauses which Congress 
clearly did not intend to abolish.17 Still others, in a more cautious vein, 
recognized the problem but refused to predict its ultimate resolution.18 
Four and one-half years of NLRB and court decisions have resolved many 
of the questions raised by these writers, but they have also created inter-
pretative problems unanticipated earlier. Today, three channels exist 
whereby a subcontracting clause may avoid the proscription of section 8(e): 
(I) the subcontracting clause may fall beyond the literal wording of section 
8(e); (2) it may be so alien to the purpose of section 8(e) that the Board 
will simply refuse to apply the literal criteria of 8(e); (3) it may find refuge 
within the construction or garment industry provisos appended to section 
8(e). Each of these possibilities will be examined in tum. 
Fclhaber, SYMPOSIUM 917, who disagrees with this conclusion. He relies chiefly upon the 
fact that Senator Morse, 105 CoNG. REc. 16399 (1959), 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1428 and Representa-
tive Thompson, 105 CONG. REc. 16590 (1959), 2 LEG1s. HIST. 1708, warned Congress that 
they believed § 8(e) would also prohibit all subcontracting clauses, yet Congress failed to 
amend the bill in response to these warnings. This proves, he concludes, that Congress 
must have intended this result. However, the more logical conclusion would seem to be 
that, because it was late in the session and the bill represented a great many delicately 
balanced compromises, Congress was fearful of reopening the bill to new amendments. 
Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. 
L. REv. 257, 273 (1959), indicates that it is also unlikely Congress believed the warnings 
were accurate. 
16 Dannett, The Legality of Subcontracting Provisions Under Section B(e), in SYMPOSIUM 
at 905; Peet, The Subcontracting Clause in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 38 U. DET. 
L.J. 389 (1961); Farmer, The Status and Application of the Secondary-Boycott and Hot-
Cargo Provisions, 48 Gro. L.J. 327, 337-38 (1960). 
17 Cox, supra note 15, at 273; Powell, The Impact of Section B(e) on Subcontracting 
Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements, SYMPOSIUM 897, 904; Comment, The 
Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 
745 (1960). 
18 Rothman, supra note II, at 85. 
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I. SUBCONTRACTING CLAUSES AND THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION S(e) 
Neither the NLRB nor the courts have looked kindly upon attempts to 
exploit the ostensible loopholes generously permeating the complex lan-
guage of section S(e).19 A slavish adherence to the literal meaning of each 
word was quickly rejected, and the slogan soon became, "[L]iteralism is not 
the touchstone for construction of section S(e)."20 This attitude is evidenced 
by the expansive interpretations accorded the following phrases within 
section S(e). 
A. "It shall be an unfair labor practice . . . to enter into any 
contract. . . ."21 
Although a later phrase in section S(e) declares unenforceable and void 
any clause whereby the employer promises to cease or refrain from doing 
business with another,22 the existence of such a clause is not an unfair labor 
practice unless it has been "entered into" within the meaning of section S(e). 
This distinction is important because, even though a clause may be un-
enforceable, it must constitute an unfair labor practice before the NLRB 
acquires jurisdiction23 to prevent a union from utilizing its post-Sand Door24 
techniques to persuade the employer "voluntarily" to comply with the 
clause.25 Many unions, therefore, were optimistic that clauses, otherwise 
violative of section S(e), would escape its proscriptions if signed (hence 
"entered into") before the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959 or 
more than six months before the filing of a complaint with the Board.26 
However, these hopes were to go unrealized. In District 9, IAMP the 
Board found an unfair labor practice under section S(e) although the clause 
in question had been signed long before that section became law. Shortly 
thereafter, in Dan McKinney Co.,28 the Board again found an unfair labor 
practice, although this time the clause in question had been signed more 
19 See Mille Drivers&: Dairy Employees, Local 546 (Minnesota Mille Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 
1314 (1961), enforced, 314 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1963). 
20 District 9, IAM v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
21 This subsection heading, as well as subsection headings IB, IC, ID and IE, are 
phrases taken from § S(e), 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. IV, 1963), and 
emphasis is added to the particular words discussed in each heading. 
22 "[A]ny contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such 
an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void .•.. " 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 
U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
2a 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958). 
24 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). 
25 See note 10 supra. 
26 The NLRA has a six-month statute of limitations. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 160(b) (1958). 
27 District 9, Int'! Ass'n of Machinists, 134 N.L.R.B. 1354 (1961) (Members Fanning 
and Brown dissenting), enforced, 315 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1962); see Automotive, Petroleum, 
Local 618 (Greater St. Louis Automotive Trimmers &: Upholsterers Ass'n), 134 N.L.R.B. 
1363 (1961) (Members Fanning and Brown dissenting). 
28 Dan McKinney Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 649 (1962) (Members Fanning and Brown took 
no part in the decision). 
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than six months before the complaint was filed. In explaining its position 
on this matter the Board stated: "[W]e have indicated our belief that the 
words 'to enter into' must be interpreted broadly and encompass the con-
cepts of reaffirmation, maintenance, or giving effect to any agreement which 
is within the scope of Section S(e)."29 With the courts' apparent acceptance 
of the Board's interpretation of these words,30 the draftsmen of subcontract-
ing clauses lost the possibility of utilizing the words "to enter into" as a 
device to escape section S(e). 
B. "It shall be an unfair labor practice . . . whereby such employer 
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from ... dealing in 
any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person. . . ." 
This peculiar wording held out particular promise to those seeking to 
circumvent the language of section 8(e). The word "refrain," while present 
in the "handling products" phrase, is conspicuously absent from the "doing 
business" phrase. Thus, the language of the statute appears not to prohibit 
an agreement whereby the employer promises only to refrain from doing 
business with another employer, provided this does not constitute a promise 
to refrain from handling his products as well. The practical application of 
this distinction could be extensive because frequently the subcontractor is 
to contribute services, and not products, to the general employer. For ex-
ample, subcontracting clauses in which the employer promises to refrain 
from using the services of another to provide the transportation and delivery 
of his goods, or to provide the maintenance or janitorial services for his 
plants and offices, would appear valid according to the statutory language. 
There is something to be said in support of such a distinction. For ex-
ample, the "dealing in products" clause, which immediately precedes the 
"doing business" clause, contains both the words "cease" and "refrain," 
and it would seem most natural and consistent with the rules of parallel 
construction simply to copy both words into this later phrase as well.31 
The fact that this was not done tends to indicate that the word "refrain" 
was dropped by conscious choice. 
However, stronger arguments militate against this distinction. The at-
mosphere of tension and urgency which prevailed when Congress drafted 
this section suggests that the variance might have been inadvertent.82 
Furthermore, early discussion of the forerunner of section 8(e) frequently 
referred to that bill as one designed to "make it an unfair labor practice 
20 Id. at 654; see General Teamsters, Local No. 890 (San Joaquin Valley Shippers' 
Labor Comm.), 1!17 N.L.R.B. 641 (1962) (Members Fanning and Brown took no part in the 
decision). 
80 See Los Angeles Mailers' Union 9, Int'l Typo. U. v. NLRB, !Ill F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 
1962): District 9, IAM v. NLRB, !115 F.2d !Ill (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
81 DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 62 (1954). 
82 See Leiter, LMRDA and its Setting, SYMPOSIUM 12, 18; Loftus, LMRDA in Retro-
spect, SYMPOSIUM 8. 
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. . . whereby such employer . . . agrees . . . to cease doing, or refrain 
from doing, business with [another employer]."33 However, the most per-
suasive argument that can be made for reading the word "refrain" into the 
"doing business" clause is that its omission would leave standing the many 
hot-cargo clauses which do not involve the products of another employer, 
and thus circumvent the statute and thwart a clear congressional policy.34 
Underscoring this last argument is the fact that the Teamsters Union, whose 
activities provoked Congress to enact his section,35 would find such a dis-
tinction tailor-made for its hot-cargo clauses, because the Teamsters Union 
is primarily involved in the service rather than manufacturing industries. 
If upheld, this distinction would have enabled the Teamsters Union to 
apply contractual secondary pressure on any trucker or warehouseman with 
whom it had a dispute through "refrain from doing business" clauses. 
Although this controversy is not yet fully resolved,36 the Board seems to 
be committed to a course of eliminating this potential "loophole" by 
obliterating any effective distinction between the two phrases. One tech-
nique to effect this purpose has been interpretation of the word "refrain," 
when used in a subcontracting clause, as containing an implied promise to 
"cease." In Arden Farms37 the Board held that section 8(e) is violated by 
a clause in which the employer promises only to refrain from doing future 
business wjth any person engaged in milk distribution. The reason given 
was that "if the term, 'refrain,' is to have its ordinary meaning, they must 
also cease whatever business they are now doing with such other persons."38 
Even though the parties' subsequent course of conduct in this case left no 
doubt that the employer was not expected to terminate his existing business 
relationships with subcontractors, the Board still found a "cease" meaning 
in the "refrain" subcontracting clause by insisting upon interpreting the 
clause as written rather than as subsequently applied by the parties.39 
The expansion of this technique was portended in Bituminous Coal 
Operators Ass'n,40 which suggests that a "cease" meaning may be implied 
any time the employer promises to "refrain" from dealing with subcon-
tractors with whom he has existing relations.41 The reasoning would be 
33 105 CONG. REc. 6557 (1959) (remarks of Senator Gore). (Emphasis added.) 
34 See note 11 supra. 
35 The original Elliot bill, forerunner of the LMRDA, was exclusively directed toward 
the common carriers. H.R. No. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 1 l.EGIS. HIST. 755; sec 
105 CoNG. REc. 5889 (1959), 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1162 (remarks of Senators Kennedy and Gore). 
36 See Hoffman v. Joint Counsel of Teamsters, 45 CCH Lab. Cas. 27423 (N.D. Cal. 
1962). This decision is criticized in Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 97, 107 (1963). 
37 Teasmters Union (Arden Farms Co.), 52 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1963). 
38 Id. at 1324. 
39 Ibid. 
40 UMW (Bituminous Coal Operators Ass'n), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 1037 
(Sept. 9, 1963). The subcontracting clause in this case seemed to violate the "dealing in 
products" phrase more clearly than the "doing business" clause. 
41 Although this case was decided on other grounds, the Board seemed cognizant of 
the fact that a "refrain" clause may ultimately result in the cessation of current business 
relationships. Id. at 1040 (dictum). 
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that the "refrain" clause will prevent the renewal of existmg contracts 
with these subcontractors, and the general employer will therefore be re-
quired to cease doing business with them when the old contracts expire. 
In still a further attempt to negate any distinction between the two 
phrases, the Board has interpreted the word "products," which is found in 
the "cease or refrain from dealing in products" phrase, so broadly that it 
is now practically synonymous with the words "doing business."42 The 
word "products" now includes thought, labor, and business enterprises as 
well as tangible objects.43 This definition is broad enough to include 
delivery services44 and presumably maintenance or janitorial services as 
well. Thus, although a subcontracting clause which requires the employer 
to refrain from using the services of another might conceivably still escape 
the "doing business" phrase, it would most probably violate the "cease or 
refrain from dealing in products" phrase. 
C. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for any ... employer to 
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby 
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain 
from . . . dealing in any of the products of any other employer, 
or to cease doing business with any other person . . . ." 
Section 8(e) appears to interdict only those clauses whereby the em-
ployer promises to cease or refrain from dealing with others. This led 
several early writers to suggest that a clause could escape this section if 
the employer promised instead to refrain from disciplining his employees 
should they refuse to handle goods which were also handled by subcon-
tractors.411 This, of course, would be an effective device to discourage sub-
contracting because employers would be hesitant to contract out work if 
their own employees could refuse to handle any material involved in the 
subcontracting process. Although this type of subcontracting clause has been 
highly prolific in spawning case law, the Board46 and the courts47 have 
consistently found that such clauses really constitute an "implied" promise 
by the employer to cease or refrain from dealing with others. Some unions. 
began inserting a companion clause requiring that management personnel 
42 See Teamsters Union (Arden Farms Co.), 52 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1963). 
43 Milk Drivers &:: Dairy Employees Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 
907 (1961). Although the Board in this case was dealing with the phrase, "products 
[which] are produced by an employer," found in § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, this interpretation of the word "products" has been carried over to § 8(e). 
44 See Teamsters Union (Arden Farms Co.), 52 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1963). But see Retail 
Clerks Union Local 770 v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 368, 371-72 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
411 Previant, The New Hot-Cargo and Secondary-Boycott Sections: A Critical Analysis, 
48 GEo. L.J. 346, 355 (1959); Comment, 45 CoRNELL L.Q. 724, 745 (1960). 
46 Dan McKinney Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 649, 652 (1962); New York Mailers' Union 6, ITU 
(New York Herald Tribune, Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 196 (1962), modified but enforced in perti-
nent part, 316 F.2d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1963); cf. Amalgamated Lithographers of America 
(Ind.), 130 N.L.R.B. 985, 988 (1961), afj'd, 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962). 
47 Los Angeles Mailers' Union 9, ITU v. NLRB, 311 F.2d 121, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
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themselves provide the labor necessary to continue dealing with the sub-
contractors rather than terminate the subcontract relationship, but the 
Board, with excusable cynicism, has found this alternative so impractical 
and unpalatable to management that realistically it amounts to an implied 
promise by the employer to cease dealing with others.4B 
D. "It shall be an unfair labor practice ... whereby such employer 
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from . . . dealing 
in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing 
business with any other person." 
Occasionally it is difficult to determine whether those with whom the 
employer agrees to cease doing business are in an employment relationship 
with him or are independent subcontractors.49 This distinction is critical 
because the Board has held that section 8(e) does not prevent an employer 
from promising a union which represents some of his employees that he 
will cease or refrain from giving certain work to other of his employees 
outside that bargaining unit.150 It is easy to see that employees are not pro-
tected by the "dealing in products" clause, but it is difficult to comprehend 
why non-bargaining unit employees are not protected by the "cease doing 
business" clause, which uses the comprehensive term "persons" for its ob-
ject. Although it is possible the Board believed these situations were ade-
quately governed by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act 
which regulate jurisdictional disputes between several employee units under 
a single employer,151 section 8(e) appears to have been prematurely dis-
missed. Section 8(b)(4)(D), the principal section regulating internal jurisdic-
tional disputes, is not violated unless the employer is forced or required to 
cease doing business with some of his employees for the benefit of other 
employees.112 However, this still leaves the union the array of devices 
48 See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 413 (Patton Warehouse, Inc.), 140 N.L.R.B. 1474, 
1482-85 (1963). 
49 For example, in one case a milk deliveryman rented his truck from the processor 
and the processor set up a route for him. However, the deliveryman had to buy the milk 
outright from the processor and he was free to sell it at any price and on whatever terms 
he wished to his own customers. His entire income came from the resale profit. The 
Board held that the deliveryman was an employee of the processor although the trial 
examiner believed he was an independent subcontractor. Milk Drivers &: Dairy Employees, 
Local 546 (Minnesota Milk Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314 (1961), enforced, 314 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 
1963). 
50 Milk Drivers &: Dairy Employees, Local 546 (Minnesota Milk Co.), supra note 49; 
Teamsters Union (Milwaukee Cheese Co.), 2 LAB. REI.. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 1134, 1135 
(Oct. 7, 1963). 
51 Section 8(b)(4)(D) prohibits "forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular 
work to employees in a particular labor organization • . • rather than to employees in 
another ~abor organization or in another trade, craft, or class ..•• " 61 Stat. 142 (1947), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (Supp. IV, 1963). (Emphasis added.) Section l0(k) of the 
NLRA gives the Board jurisdiction to determine disputes arising under § 8(b)(4)(D), 61 
Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1958). 
5_2 See note 51 supra. 
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developed after Sand Door53 to convince the employer "voluntarily" to 
enter into and respect a clause which requires him to allocate work to the 
bargaining unit employees at the expense of the non-bargaining unit em-
ployees.114 Consequently, if the union is able to convince the Board that 
certain "independent contractors" are really employees and not subcon-
tractors, it will be free to request clauses against them identical in nature 
and function to the subcontracting or hot-cargo clauses. Furthermore, be-
cause the line between an independent subcontractor and an employee is 
not well defined, this offers substantial opportunity to those who wish to 
draft subcontracting clauses which escape section 8(e).55 
II. SUBCONTRACTING CLAUSES AND THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 8(e) 
In spite of the unions' failure to convince the Board that various sub-
contracting clauses are beyond the literal wording of section 8(e), the Board 
has not been unmindful that the congressional policy behind section 8(e) 
did not contemplate abolition of those subcontracting clauses which are 
free from secondary pressure characteristics.56 As a result, the Board has 
become amenable to the suggestion that it exempt such clauses from the 
operation of section 8(e).57 However, this exemption has proved arduous 
to administer because of the difficulty of determining pragmatically whether 
a given subcontracting clause possesses secondary pressure characteristics. 
This problem of classification is created by two factors. First, since one of 
the inevitable ramifications of any subcontracting clause is that the employer 
must cease or refrain from doing business with certain other employers, a 
subcontracting clause can be an effective substitute for the defunct hot-cargo 
clause. Therefore, unions frequently camouflage prohibited secondary ob-
jectives within subcontracting clauses which, on the face of the contract, 
appear directed only toward primary objectives.58 Although such a clause 
deals with subcontracting, it would surely subvert congressional policy to 
grant it immunity. This forces the Board to undertake an extensive analysis 
of each subcontracting clause in order to determine whether it is as foreign 
to the proscription of section S(e) as it might appear at first glance. 
58 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). 
5i See note 10 supra. 
1515 Among the relevant factors in drawing such a line are (1) the degree of control 
exercised over the one doing the work, (2) the method of payment, (3) the place where 
the work is to be done, (4) the ownership of the tools used, and (5) specialization of the 
work done. See NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 1948); 
62 MtcH. L. R.Ev. 127 (1963). 
156 See note 15 supra. 
157 See Orange Belt Dist. Council v. NLRB, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (55 L.R.R.M.) 2293, 2295 
(D.C. Cir. Feb. IO, 1964). 
158 For example, the following clause is phrased in subcontracting terms: "Whenever 
the Employer finds it feasible to send work out that comes under the jurisdiction of the 
Union and this contract, preference must be given to such shop or subcontractors approved 
or having contracts with [this Union]." District 9, Int'! Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 315 
F.2d 3!1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Nevertheless, by refusing to approve "unfair" subcontractors, 
the union is able to use this as a hot-cargo clause. 
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Second, even though a subcontracting clause is entered into in good 
faith, it will frequently assume an unfamiliar, if not bizarre form as the 
result of a compromise between the conflicting wishes of labor and manage-
ment. Fearing the erosion of job opportunities for the employees in the 
bargaining unit, the unions often feel it necessary to obtain some restriction 
or prohibition on management's right to subcontract out work.59 Employers, 
on the other hand, widely regard the right to subcontract as a managerial 
prerogative which ought not to be shared with labor. 60 In addition, manage-
ment has a strong desire to retain some flexibility to subcontract work when 
a subcontractor offers a higher degree of automation, economies of speciali-
zation, or a lower wage rate, and is thus able to do the work at a substantial 
saving.61 Strange hybrid clauses, which defy ready classification, spring from 
these competing interests of labor and management and occupy a "twi-
light zone" where subcontracting is permitted, but only on certain condi-
tions, to certain subcontractors, or upon payment of certain penalties. 
As an aid in determining which subcontracting clauses should be eligible 
for this exemption from the pronouncements of section S(e), the Board has 
found section 8(b)(4)(B)62 a helpful analogy.63 Section 8(b)(4)(B) rests the 
legality of certain union activities upon a determination of whether the 
union objectives involved are primary or secondary in nature. 64 This 
59 Several recent decisions have held that an employer must bargain with the union 
before he decides to subcontract out work. Town &: Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 316 
F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced, 
322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963). But cf. Adams Dairy v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963). 
However, this does not alleviate in any real sense the union's concern for job security 
because, once the employer has discussed his intentions in good faith with the union, 
he may proceed with his plans to subcontract even though no agreement has been reached. 
Town &: Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, supra at 847; Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., supra 
at 551; see Note, 38 NoTRE DAME LAw. 288 (1963). See generally Comment, 64 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 294 (1964). 
60 Lunden, supra note 3, at 579. 
61 Weber, Plant Removals and Subcontracting of Work-Social and Economic Con-
siderations, 14 LAB. L.J. 373-74 (1963). 
62 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization ... to threaten, coerce, 
or restrain any person ... where •.. an object thereof is: ..• (B) forcing or requiring 
any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the 
products of any other producer •.• or to cease doing business with any other person ..•. 
Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, 
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing .•.. " 61 Stat. 141 
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1963). (Emphasis added.) 
63 See Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 
987 (1962). At least one author would have § 8(b)(4)(B) serve as more than just an analogy 
to § S(e). It is his contention that "the test should be whether a union would violate the 
secondary-boycott ban of section 8(b)(4)(B) by inducing .•. employees to make their 
employer do what he has committed himself to do in the agreement. If the inducement 
would be a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B), the agreement should be held a violation of 
section S(e)." St. Antoine, Secondary Boycotts and Hot Cargo: A Study in Balance of Power, 
40 U. DET. L.J. 189, 206-07 (1962). (Emphasis added.) It is submitted, however, that this 
provides little additional assistance, as it just pushes the question back one more step. 
Furthermore, there are several significant differences between the two sections which would 
frequently render this proposed test inaccurate. See, e.g., note 65 infra. 
64 The word "primary" as used herein refers to an activity or objective which is of 
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primary-secondary objective dichotomy can also be utilized profitably to 
determine the legality of various subcontracting clauses under section 8(e). 
However, the term "object," which includes intermediate and incidental 
objects when used in section 8(b)(4)(B),65 should be restricted within the 
context of section 8(e) to mean only those ultimate objects or purposes 
which motivated the union to request such a clause.66 Were the more 
expansive section 8(b)(4)(B) definition of "object" applied under section 
8(e), it would result in a practical desiccation of the exemption because 
every subcontracting clause contains an incidental object of a secondary 
nature. Illustratively, although the ultimate object of a particular sub-
contracting clause may be primary in that the union seeks to protect the 
work of the bargaining unit, this arrangement necessarily contemplates the 
incidental secondary objective of preventing the employer from giving that 
work to another employer. This incidental secondary objective, however, 
is quite different from the tainted secondary pressure embodied in a hot-
cargo clause whereby a union deliberately uses one employer as a battering 
ram to break down another employer's resistance to certain union demands. 
It possesses neither the tendency to enlarge outside labor disputes nor the 
capacity to involve neutral employers in foreign altercations. Therefore, the 
inevitable presence of such an incidental objective should not be sufficient 
to condemn the subcontracting clause. 
Thus, with several notable exceptions to be discussed later, the exemp-
tion from section S(e) constructed by the Board might well read: "If the 
exclusive object of a subcontracting clause is protection of the primary 
direct concern to the employees in the bargaining unit rather than something which is 
necessarily first or major in importance. The word "secondary" as used herein refers to 
an activity or objective which is directly concerned with the labor policies of an employer 
outside the bargaining unit rather than something which is necessarily inferior or minor 
in importance. 
65 Several Board decisions dealing with § 8(b)(4)(B) seem to define the word "object" 
to include "intermediate" objects as well as "ultimate" objects. International Longshore-
men's Ass'n (The Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs), 137 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1184-86 (1962) (Member 
Brown dissenting); Local 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen (Arthur Venneri Co.), 137 
N.L.R.B. 828 (1962), aff'd as modified, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Member Brown 
dissenting); Local 1066, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Wiggin Terminals, Inc.), 137 N.L.R.B. 
45 (1962) (Members Brown and Fanning dissenting). However, in each of these situations 
the employer of the bargaining unit did not control the work which his employees sought. 
Consequently, when his employees struck him, although their "ultimate" object was only to 
obtain more work for their own unit, it was secondary activity of the kind prohibited by 
§ 8(b)(4)(B) because the strike was designed to force their employer to pressure an outside 
employer into re-allocating his work. This problem can not arise in the context of the 
subcontracting clause because the employer who is asked to sign the subcontracting clause 
is always the same employer who controls the work and he is not thereby required to put 
pressure on an outside employer in order to obtain the work re-allocation sought by the 
bargaining unit. 
66 See Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 
985-86 (1962); cf. Local 761, JUE v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672-74 (1961); Douds v. lnt'l 
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 224 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1955). But see Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters (Precon Trucking Corp.), 139 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1087 (1962). 
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economic interests of the employees in the bargaining unit as opposed to 
the application of secondary pressure on a subcontractor in an effort to 
obtain his acquiescence in union demands, the clause falls outside the 
congressional purpose for section S(e) and will therefore be exempt from 
its proscription."67 
Because the application of this rule necessarily involves an ad hoc 
determination of the motives which lie behind each particular clause, 
generalizations should be approached with a certain amount of skepticism.68 
The crucial considerations in ferreting out the true "objects" behind any 
given clause will be individualized factors such as the relative bargaining 
strength of the two parties, the existence of a dispute or possible dispute be-
tween the bargaining unit union and the subcontractors, the past course of 
dealings between the union and general employer, and the general economic 
personality of the particular industry involved. Nevertheless, a general 
analysis of the various categories of subcontracting clauses may help to 
provide some guidelines and isolate those characteristics peculiar to each 
category which the Board and courts are likely to find relevant. 
A. Clauses Which Restrict the Type of Work Which May Be 
Subcontracted 
When a subcontracting clause unqualifiedly stipulates that the employer 
may not subcontract out any work which is or has been traditionally 
performed by employees within the bargaining unit, both the Board69 and 
the courts70 have readily recognized its validity. Such a clause reflects the 
primary objective of protecting job opportunities for the employees within 
the bargaining unit. Furthermore, the incidental secondary effects of such 
a clause are minimal because the subcontractor is not deprived of work 
which he has relied upon in the past; he is merely denied the opportunity 
to acquire new work from the employer. In addition, this clause exerts no 
secondary pressure on the subcontractor to change his internal labor prac• 
tices because, regardless of those practices, he is precluded from acquiring 
the work covered by the subcontracting clause. 
These same considerations are equally persuasive in defending the 
validity of a subcontracting clause which permits the employer to subcon-
tract out only overflow work which the bargaining unit is unable to perform 
67 This test was clearly established in Orange Belt Dist. Council v. NLRB, 2 L\B. 
REL. REP. (55 L.R.R.M.) 2293 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 1964). See Bakery Wagon Drivers and 
Salesmen v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 353, 358 (D.C. Cir. Feb. IO, 1963) (dictum). 
68 See Retail Clerks Local 770 v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 368, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Milk 
Drivers &: Dairy Employers, Local 546 (Minnesota Milk Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314 (1961), 
enforced, 314 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1963). 
69 Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 
984-86 (1962); UMW (Bituminous Coal Operators Ass'n), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 
1037, 1038 (Sept. 9, 1963) (dictum). 
70 Coulon v. Carey Cadillac Renting Co., 50 L.R.R.M. 2888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Bakery 
Wagon Drivers v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dictum). 
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because of a shortage of equipment or manpower.71 Such a clause, while 
still maximizing the work opportunities for the bargaining unit, is often 
more desirable to the employer because it gives him sufficient flexibility to 
accommodate temporary or periodic increases in his work load without 
resort to the more expensive procedure of expanding his facilities or hiring 
additional employees, as he would be forced to do if subcontracting were 
completely prohibited. 
Although these clauses are valid when standing alone, the Board has 
diligently prevented their use in a manner which achieves secondary ob-
jectives. These clauses could be so used, for example, if the union enforced 
the written clause only when it had a dispute with one of the employer's 
subcontractors. If the enforcement of the written clause has not been uni-
form, the Board is certain to suspect an underlying hot-cargo agreement in 
contravention of section S(e).72 
However, the Board seems to discard the "primary-secondary objective" 
test when the clause covers work which has not been performed traditionally 
by the bargaining unit.73 A clause covering non-traditional work may be 
just as consecrated to the primary objective of bettering the lot of the 
bargaining unit employees and just as foreign to the congressional purpose 
for section 8(e) as those clauses involving only the work traditionally done 
within the bargaining unit.u Nevertheless, there are several justifications 
for the decision to apply section 8(e) strictly in this situation. First, such a 
clause is more likely to encompass a disguised hot-cargo purpose; it possesses 
a greater capacity for exerting effective secondary pressure on disfavored 
subcontractors than does a clause involving traditionally done work be-
cause it may actually deprive subcontractors of present business rather than 
simply deny them the possibility of future business. The discernment of the 
actual objectives behind a given subcontracting clause is a sufficiently im-
precise science that the Board might understandably balk at the prospect 
of searching into the motives behind a clause so susceptible to misuse. 
Second, while clauses covering only traditional work tend to stabilize the 
work distribution by preserving the status quo, clauses covering non-tradi-
tional work tend to disrupt the status quo and create attendant problems 
of unemployment and readjustment for employees and communities losing 
their traditional work. 
71 See Retail Clerks Local 770 v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 368, 373.74 (D.C. Cir. 1961) 
(dictum); cf. Teamsters Union (Arden Farms Co.), 52 L.R.R.M. 1322, 1323 (1963) (dictum). 
72 See Bakery Wagon Drivers & Salesmen, Local 484 (Sunrise Transportation), 137 
N.L.R.B. 987 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
73 See Teamsters Union (Wilson & Co.), 53 L.R.R.M. 1475, 1477-78 (1963) (Chairman 
McCulloch and Member Brown dissenting); Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107 
(E. A. Gallagher & Sons), 131 N.L.R.B. 925 (1961) (Chairman McCulloch and Member 
Brown took no part in this decision); cf. Local 282, Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters (Precon 
Trucking Corp.), 139 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1086-89 (1962) (Member Brown dissenting). 
7<l See Teamsters Union (Wilson & Co.), supra note 73, at 1481-82 (dissenting opinion 
of Chairman McCulloch). 
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However, a vocal minority of the Board remains unconvinced that sub-
contracting clauses involving non-traditional work should be categorically 
condemned under section S(e).75 They are more confident of the Board's 
ability to detect a secondary objective. In addition, they assert that a union 
has always been free to bargain for the expansion of the employment op-
portunities within the bargaining unit. Finally, the minority is worried 
about the fact that the majority rule might deprive a bargaining unit of the 
opportunity to acquire new work which is created by technology between 
bargaining sessions even though it falls within the jurisdiction of the unit. 
because it cannot be classified as work which that unit has traditionally 
done. The result is that this area of the law can not be regarded as con-
clusively settled. 
B. Clauses Which Limit the Subcontractors With Whom the 
General Employer May Deal 
The most recurrent subcontracting clause in this category is one that 
permits the employer to subcontract work from the bargaining unit only 
to those subcontractors who provide wages and working conditions for their 
employees comparable to those received by the employees within the bar-
gaining unit.76 In support of such a clause it is contended that its objective 
is the primary one of protecting the jobs of the employees within the bar-
gaining unit because a major incentive to subcontract is removed when the 
employer is prohibited from seeking a cheaper labor force to do his work.77 
Against this position, two objections are commonly raised. First, it is 
contended that this clause can not be satisfactorily explained by the pri-
mary objective of preserving jobs for the bargaining unit because, if this 
were the union's only objective, it could be more directly and securely ac-
complished by a complete prohibition on subcontracting. It is claimed that 
this reveals a secondary objective to apply pressure on subcontractors to 
raise the wages of their own employees so that they may remain eligible 
75 Teamsters Union (Wilson &: Co.), supra note 73, at 1481 (dissenting opinion of 
Chairman McCulloch). If new work displaces the work originally done by the bargaining 
unit it is hoped that the court would be more inclined to find the new work of a nature 
which has been "traditionally" performed by the bargaining unit in order to permit the 
bargaining unit to recapture the job opportunities lost when the old work was displaced. 
Although the minority in Wilson & Co. made this argument, the majority nevertheless 
held that a bargaining unit which had provided local delivery service for an employer 
could not attempt to recapture work lost to a direct non-stop shipper because it had not 
traditionally engaged in deliveries which originated outside the city limits. 
76 For a good example of such a subcontracting clause, see UMW (Bituminous Coal 
Operators Ass'n), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 1037, 1038 (Sept. 9, 1963), where the 
clause read: "[The employers] agree that all bituminous coal ... procured or acquired by 
them ... under a subcontract arrangement, shall be or shall have been mined or 
produced under terms and conditions which are as favorable to the employees as those 
provided for in this Contract." 
77 Sec Teamsters Union (Wilson &: Co.), 53 L.R.R.M. 1475, 1482-84 (1963) (dissenting 
opinion of Member Brown); cf. Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293-94 (1959). 
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for the general employers' business.78 However, this ignores the reality of 
compromise. It is possible that the employer may simply refuse to surrender 
his entire ability to subcontract work, and that the union must settle for 
a compromise clause which at least removes the attraction of a cheaper labor 
force from those factors which might encourage a decision to subcontract. 
Consequently, it is erroneous to presume conclusively that this kind of 
clause evidences a secondary objective. Nevertheless, like the clause in-
volving work which has not traditionally been performed by the bargaining 
unit employees, such a clause possesses sufficient danger of being misused 
that extreme skepticism on the part of the Board is again justified. 
The second objection is that the ramifications of this clause are so 
strongly secondary in nature that it contravenes the congressional policy 
behind section 8(e) even if the objective of the clause is primary. Con-
cededly, such a clause could be used to exert considerable pressure on the 
various subcontractors to raise the wage level of their employees to bargain-
ing unit wage rates. However, it seems more important for section 8(e) 
classification purposes that a bona fide subcontracting clause of this charac-
ter has neither the tendency to spread labor disputes nor the effect of 
forcing a neutral employer into a secondary labor controversy-the two 
problems with which Congress was most concerned in enacting section 
S(e).10 
Only a problematical conclusion can be ventured as to the ultimate 
resolution of these conflicting arguments. The Board has exhibited an un-
mistakable inclination toward the invalidation of all clauses of this charac-
ter. 80 On the other hand, there is clear dicta by the courts suggesting that, 
absent evidence of secondary motives, a clause of this nature should properly 
be beyond the censure of section S(e).81 It is submitted that the courts have 
embraced the view more harmonious with the congressional purpose for 
section 8(e) by retaining the "primary-secondary object" test and by grant-
ing absolution to such a clause when the absence of a secondary objective 
is clearly established. 
It is further suggested that the Board's decisions implying the contrary 
conclusion may be satisfactorily distinguished because in each case there 
was some evidence of a secondary objective. The subcontracting clause in 
78 See UMW (Bituminous Coal Operators Ass'n), 2 LAB. REI.. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 
1037, 1039-40 (Sept. 9, 1963). 
70 See notes 7-8 supra. 
80 See Teamsters Union (Milwaukee Cheese Co.), 2 LAB. REI.. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 1134, 
1135 (Oct. 7, 1963); UMW (Bituminous Coal Operators Ass'n), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 
1037, 1039-40 (Sept. 9, 1963); Painters Union (Falstaff Brewing Corp.), 2 LAB. REL. REP. 
(54 L.R.R.M.) 1001, 1002 (Sept. 2, 1963); Teamsters Union (Wilson &: Co.), 53 L.R.R.M. 
1475, 1478-79 (1963) (Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown dissenting); Truck Drivers 
Local 413 (Patton Warehouse, Inc.), 140 N.L.R.B. 1474, 1485-86 (1963). 
81 See Retail Clerks Local 770 v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 368, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1961); District 9, 
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (dictum); cf. Teamsters 
Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293-94 (1959); Building &: Construction Trades Council 
v. NLRB, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (55 L.R.R.M.) 2297 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 1964) (dictum). 
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Wilson & Co.82 pertained only to overflow work which the bargaining unit, 
by definition, could not perform in any event.83 In that situation there ob-
viously could not be a primary objective for requiring that this work be done 
only by subcontractors who pay union wages. The Milwaukee Cheese,84 
Falsta[f,85 and Patton Warehouse86 cases all involved bargaining units of 
craft rather than employer-wide dimension, and in each case the Board was 
confronted with a clause similar to the following: "The employer agrees 
to refrain from using the services of any person who does not observe the 
wages, hours, and conditions of employment established by labor unions 
having jurisdiction over the type of services perf ormed."81 This clause can 
not be fully explained by primary objectives because it limits not only 
those subcontractors to whom the general employer may give work which 
would otherwise be done in the bargaining unit, but it similarly limits 
those subcontractors who may receive work of a nature completely beyond 
the jurisdiction and interest of the bargaining unit. For example, if a 
union representing a bargaining unit of truck drivers obtains such a clause, 
the clause would restrict the trucking company in subcontracting mainte-
nance work on its trucks as well as delivery work, although the bargaining 
unit has no primary interest in maintenance.88 In addition, these limitations 
also apply to overflow work in which the bargaining unit has no legitimate 
primary interest. The Bituminous Coal case,89 although the most difficult 
to distinguish, involved extrinsic evidences of a secondary objective behind 
the subcontracting clause, which could be used to explain the Board's 
holding. 90 Although these various factors may be used to distinguish the 
Board decisions, they should not obscure the fact that the Board basically 
remains hostile to this kind of clause.91 
82 Teamsters Union (Wilson &: Co.), 53 L.R.R.M. 1475 (1963) (Chairman McCulloch 
and Member Brown dissenting). 
sa Id. at 1478. 
84 Teamsters Union (Milwaukee Cheese Co.), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 1134 
(Oct. 7, 1963). 
85 Painters Union (Falstaff Brewing Corp.), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 1001 (Sept. 
2, 1963). Although this subcontracting clause reads somewhat differently from that found 
in the other two cases, it shares the same defect. 
86 Truck Drivers Local 413 (Patton Warehouse, Inc.), 140 N.L.R.B. 1474 (1963). 
87 Id. at 1485. (Emphasis added.) 
88 Teamsters Union (Wilson &: Co.), 53 L.R.R.M. 1475, 1484 n.30 (1963) {dissenting 
opinion of Member Brown). 
89 UMW (Bituminous Coal Operators Ass'n), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 1037 
(Sept. 9, 1963). 
90 This involved a multiple employer bargaining unit. The Board felt that, under the 
particular circumstances of the case, the union could have obtained a clause which re• 
quired that all subcontracting be done by other employers within the bargaining unit. 
Because the union permitted subcontracting outside the bargaining unit to any sub• 
contractor who paid union wages, this evidenced a desire to influence the labor policies 
of outside employers which was inconsistent with an exclusive objective to maximize jobs 
for the bargaining unit. See id. at 1040. 
91 "As we have found one of the objects of the ••• clause ••• is to ••• require the 
packers to assign to the employees in the bargaining unit work which they had never 
customarily performed before • • • we find that the • • • clause . • • is an agreement 
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Another type of clause which restricts the general employer's choice of 
subcontractors is one which permits him to subcontract only to other em-
ployers who are signatories with the union representing his bargaining 
unit.92 In this case the argument of "removing the economic incentive to 
subcontract" seems less convincing because the general employer is pro-
hibited from dealing with all non-signatory subcontractors even though they 
are paying union wages or better.93 It is also argued that since a total pro-
hibition on subcontracting is valid, a fortiori a clause which only prohibits 
subcontracting to non-union employers should also be valid.94 This argu-
ment, however, fails to recognize that Congress was concerned about second-
ary rather than subcontracting clauses, and that this particular clause 
applies a substantial secondary pressure on the subcontractor to unionize 
which pressure is absent from a clause that absolutely prohibits subcontract-
ing.911 As a result, the Board96 and the courts97 have easily found such 
clauses to be violations of section S(e) because they are infected with the 
secondary objective of pressing unionism upon outside employers. Nor has 
the response toward these clauses been more benevolent when they are 
phrased so as to require only that the employer give "preference" to the 
signatory subcontractors; this still results in a practical discrimination 
against non-union subcontractors.98 
C. Clauses Which Affix Certain Penalties to the Decision 
To Subcontract 
This category contains a heterogeneous assortment of clauses sharing 
the one characteristic that each permits the employer to subcontract when-
ever and to whomever he pleases-for a price. The popularity of the 
"penalty" clause is only partly explained by the unions' ill-advised belief 
that such a clause acquires immunity to section S(e) in that the employer 
agrees to assume certain penalties should he subcontract, rather than being 
required to agree actually to cease or refrain from doing business with 
others.99 In addition, a penalty clause is often preferred by the employer 
violative of Section 8(e) .••. " Teamsters Union (Wilson &: Co.), 53 L.R.R.M. 1475, 1478 
(1963). 
112 An example of this is the clause in Retail Clerks (Frito Co.), 138 N.L.R.B. 244, 245 
(1962), which reads, "The Employers shall not sub-contract any work ordinarily performed 
by retail clerks in the stores or markets of the Employers, ••• except that such work may 
be sub-contracted to an employer who is signatory to an Agreement with the Union." 
oa See Teamsters Union (Wilson&: Co.), 53 L.R.R.M. 1475, 1476-77 (1963). 
94 This argument was unsuccessfully advanced by the union in District 9, Int'! Ass'n 
of Machinists v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
IIIS Id. at 36. 
96 Retail Clerks (Frito Co.), 138 N.L.R.B. 244 (1962); Teamsters Union (Arden Farms 
Co.), 52 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1963). 
117 District 9, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
118 Automotive, Petroleum, Local 618 (Greater St. Louis Automotive Trimmers &: 
Upholsterers Ass'n), 134 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1961); Highway Truck Drivers &: Helpers, Local 
107, Etc. (E. A. Gallagher 8e Sons), 131 N.L.R.B. 925 (1961). 
011 See Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Lithographers, 180 F. Supp. 294, 301-03 (N.D. 
Cal. 1960); cf. notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text. 
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as a compromise arrangement because of its ability to retain for him some 
flexibility to subcontract, while also compensating the bargaining unit for 
the resulting diminution of work. In determining whether a given penalty 
clause possesses a secondary objective it is necessary to examine both the 
penalty itself and the conditions which invoke its imposition.100 Only if 
both can be fully explained by primary motives will a clause of this nature 
be permitted to elude the proscriptions of section 8(e). 
One type of penalty clause requires the employer to pay full wages to 
each idle employee within the bargaining unit for the period during which 
work that could be performed by the bargaining unit is being done by sub-
contractors.101 Although closely akin to the "overflow" clause discussed 
earlier,102 this clause is often more attractive to labor and management 
because of its greater flexibility. The employer may still value the ability 
to subcontract if his subcontractor is sufficiently automated and economical 
to offset the additional expense of paying the salaries of his own idle 
workers. The employees, on the other hand, acquire protection against a 
planned program of cutting back production where the employer, by dis-
posing of some of his equipment, greatly decreases his own capacity, thereby 
dilating the work which he would then be able to subcontract under a 
straight "overflow" clause. The objective behind this penalty is primary 
in nature because it is designed for the direct benefit of the bargaining unit 
through compensation for lost wages. Furthermore, the condition which 
invokes this penalty is no more secondary in nature than that in a standard 
"overflow" clause, which has already acquired acceptance as a valid clause 
under section S(e).103 Consequently, although there has been no case law 
directly on point, this clause seems to have a firm claim to validity.104 
A second type of penalty clause permits the union to reopen the collec-
tive bargaining agreement to new negotiations if the employer subcontracts 
work.105 The claim to immunity from section 8(e) is here predicated upon 
100 See Bakery Wagon Drivers v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
101 Such a clause might read as follows: "The employer remains free to subcontract 
work, but, if work is subcontracted while any of his employees are laid off or working less 
than 40 hours a week, then the employer is obligated for the duration of the subcontracting 
to pay such employees the difference between their current wages and the wages they 
would receive if they worked a full 40 hour week." Cf. Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters 
(Precon Trucking Corp.), 139 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1962). 
102 See note 73 and accompanying text supra. 
103 Ibid. 
104 In Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Precon Trucking Corp.), 139 N.L.R.B. 
1077 (1962), the Board held invalid a clause requiring the employer to pay each idle man 
his daily wage as liquidated damages during the period that work is subcontracted out in 
violation of an agreement not to subcontract work which could be done by the bargaining 
unit. However, if the clause had allowed the employer to subcontract out the work 
without violating the collective bargaining agreement by assuming the consequences of 
paying wages to the idle employees, there is a strong possibility that the Board would 
have upheld the clause. Id. at 1089-90. 
105 The clause might read as follows: "The employer is free to subcontract out 
work, but if he should avail himself of this right, then the union has the option to 
reopen the contract for the limited purpose of renegotiating wages, overtime, seniority, 
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the contention that the basic assumptions underlying the old collective 
bargaining agreement are altered when the employer decides to subcontract 
out work. It is asserted, therefore, that new arrangements concerning the 
length of the work week, unemployment benefits, new job assignments, 
etc., must be made to protect the employees within the bargaining unit.106 
However, the great latitude given the union in implementation of the 
penalty casts doubt upon the validity of this type of clause. For example, 
renegotiations might become substantially more difficult if the employer 
chooses to deal with subcontractors currently disfavored by the union. Even 
in the absence of an explicit threat of this nature, the experienced employer 
will surely recognize the danger and probably choose to avoid those subcon-
tractors whom the union is attempting to pressure into labor settlements, 
rather than precipitate a bitter renegotiation. The Board, however, has not 
yet had to determine whether this penalty sufficiently suggests the possibility 
of a secondary objective to invalidate the clause, because it has been con-
fronted only with clauses which invoke this penalty when the subcontracting 
is to non-union employers. As there is no valid primary reason why the 
union should need to renegotiate only when the subcontracting goes to a 
non-union employer, it has been easy to find a fatal secondary objective in 
these cases.107 
A third penalty clause allows the employer to subcontract to whomever 
he wishes, provided he bear the burden of providing managerial personnel 
to handle all materials which are also handled by ariy subcontractor desig-
nated "unfair" by the union.108 After the unions failed in their attempt to 
steer this "refusal to handle" clause around the language of section S(e),109 
they began to suggest instead that it lay beyond the purpose of the section. 
Although it has been urged with considerable passion that this clause em-
bodies a primary objective in that it shields the employees from the dis-
tasteful task of having to touch the same material touched by an "unfair" 
employer,11° the Board seems more impressed with the fact that the "refusal 
and the pension fund." Cf. Employing Lithographers of Greater Miami v. NLRB, 301 F.2d 
20, 29 (5th Cir. 1962). 
100 See Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Lithographers, 180 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 
1961). 
101 See NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers of America (Ind.), 309 F.2d 31, 36 (9th 
Cir. 1962); Employing Lithographers of Greater Miami v. NLRB, 301 F.2d 20, 29-30 (5th 
Cir. 1962). 
108 Cf. Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Lithographers, 180 F. Supp. 294, 303 (N.D. 
Cal. 1960), which involved the following clause: "The Employers agree that they will 
not discharge, discipline or discriminate against any employee because such employee 
refuses to handle any lithographic production work which was made in a shop not under 
contract with the Amalgamated Lithographers of America .... " 
100 See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text. 
110 See NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers of America (Ind.), 309 F.2d 31, 42 (9th 
Cir. 1962). But cf. Truck Drivers Local 413 (Patton Warehouse, Inc.), 140 N.L.R.B. 1474, 
1481-82 (1963), where the Board accepted an argument similar to this in upholding a 
clause which protects employees from discipline if they refuse to obey the distasteful (and 
often dangerous) request to cross a legitimate picket line surrounding the subcontractor's 
plants. 
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to handle" consequence occurs only when the employer is dealing with an 
"unfair" subcontractor against whom the union wishes to apply pressure. 
Because this clause is an exact duplicate of the hot-cargo clause, both in 
form and effect, the Board has consistently presumed a secondary objective 
which renders the clause violative of section S(e).111 
III. SUBCONTRACTING CLAUSES AND THE PRov1sos TO SECTION 8(e) 
The final possibility for a subcontracting clause to escape section 8(e) 
is to acquire absolution through one of the two provisos appended to the 
section. 
The first proviso exempts agreements between unions and employers 
in the construction industry which relate to the subcontracting of work to 
be done at the construction site.112 Since the employees of the general 
contractor often work alongside the employees of the subcontractors at 
the construction site, Congress felt that this situation was particularly preg• 
nant with labor strife unless the employees of the general contractor could 
obtain a promise that on-site work would be subcontracted only to "fair" 
employers who would not create friction.113 Hence a proviso was added to 
section 8(e) to exempt this kind of promise. With this purpose for the 
proviso in mind, the Board has resisted attempts to expand its scope to 
include work which is merely capable of being done at the job site in 
addition to work actually performed there.114 As a result, this proviso will 
not provide shelter for an agreement relating to the subcontracting of 
prefabrication work done away from the actual job site.1111 
Considerable controversy has centered on the effect of this proviso upon 
section 8(b)(4)(A),U6 which proscribes the use of force or coercion to obtain 
any agreement prohibited by section 8(e), and section 8(b)(4)(B),117 which 
prohibits the use of force or coercion to achieve the same secondary objec-
tives which section 8(e) prevents from being attained by agreement. The 
Board has held that it is an unfair labor practice if force or coercion is used 
to obtain a clause which, if entered into voluntarily, would be sheltered 
111 See Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Lithographers, 180 F. Supp. 294, 303-04 (N.D. 
Cal. 1960). 
112 See note 1 supra. 
113 Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 97, 110-11 (1963). 
114 Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council (Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 977 
(1962). 
115 Sheet Metal Workers Int'! Ass'n, AFL-CIO (The Burt Mfg. Co.), 127 N.L.R.B. 1629, 
1633 (1960). This issue evoked substantial controversy in Congress. For a presentation of 
the opposing arguments, see Farmer, The Status and Application of the Secondary-Boy-
cott and Hot-Cargo Provisions, 48 GEO. L.J. 327, 342-43 (1960). 
116 Section 8(b)(4)(A) reads: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion ... to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person, ••• where ... an object thereof is 
.•. [A.] Forcing or requiring any employer .•. to enter into any agreement which is 
prohibited by subsection (e) of this section .••• " 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(4)(A) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
117 For the text of 8(b)(4)(B), see note 62 supra. 
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from section 8(e) by the construction industry proviso.118 However, the 
courts have adopted the better view in reaching the contrary conclusion.119 
Section 8(b)(4)(A) surely is not violated in this situation, because it prohibits 
coercion only when used to obtain a clause which contravenes section 8(e), 
and this is not done by the clause in question because of the construction 
industry proviso. Nor does such coercion violate section 8(b)(4)(B), because 
the union's objective behind the coercion is not directly to force the em-
ployer to cease dealing with another, but only to obtain the inclusion of a 
certain clause in the collective bargaining agreement. However, there is 
unanimity in the conclusion that it is an unfair labor practice to use 
coercion to enforce a clause already in a collective bargaining contract 
which is covered by the construction proviso.120 In this instance the coercion 
is being used directly to cause the cessation of a business relationship, and 
section 8(b)(4)(B) is thereby violated. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a 
court would enforce such a clause for the union or award damages to the 
union if the employer failed to honor it, because, in a sense, this would also 
constitute coercion to obtain the cessation of a business relationship in 
violation of section 8(b)(4)(B).121 Consequently, a clause which relies on the 
construction proviso for immunity from section 8(e) retains the same un-
enforceable status it acquired after Sand Door.122 
The second proviso exempts agreements concerning jobbers, manufac-
turers, contractors, and subcontractors, but not retailers, who work on the 
goods or premises of a jobber or manufacturer of clothing and apparel or 
perform a part of the integrated process of production of clothing and 
apparel.123 The deplorable history of sweatshops in the garment industry 
and the difficulty which unions encountered in trying to organize them 
because of the ease with which they were disbanded and set up elsewhere 
led Congress to conclude that the unions needed to retain the hot-cargo 
clause as an instrument for instituting unionism and better working con-
ditions in this industry.124 Therefore, Congress not only exempted the 
garment industry from section 8(e) and section 8(b)(4)(A), but also ex-
empted the industry from section 8(b)(4)(B) by specifically providing that 
118 Hod Carriers Union (Fiesta Pools, Inc.), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (55 L.R.R.M.) 1070 Gan. 
20, 1964); Hod Carriers Union (Swimming Pool Gunite Contractors), 2 LAB. REL. REP. 
(54 L.R.R.M.) 1165, 1168 (Oct. 14, 1963). 
119 Laborers Union, Local 383 v. NLRB, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (54 L.R.R.M.) 2246 (9th 
Cir. OcL 14, 1963); Cuneo v. Essex County & Vicinity DisL Council of Carpenters, 207 F. 
Supp. 932 (D.N.J. 1962); Lebus v. Local 60, 193 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1961). 
120 See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (55 L.R.R.M.) 
2112 (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 1964); Lebus v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 188 
F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1960); Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 140 N.L.R.B. 
458 (1963). 
121 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers Int'! Ass'n v. Hardy Corp., 218 F. Supp. 556, 561-62 
(N.D. Ala. 1963). But see Orange Belt DisL Council v. NLRB, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (55 
L.R.R.M.) 2293 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 1964). 
122 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). 
12s See note l supra. 
124 Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 97, 109-10 (1963). 
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these clauses are fully enforceable by the union. Because the language of 
this proviso is clear and its scope limited, little case law has developed in 
this area. The constitutionality of the proviso has been challenged on the 
ground that it creates an arbitrary classification, but the courts have felt 
that the history of the industry and its highly integrated nature provide a 
rational basis for this special treatment.125 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The expansive interpretation of the language of section S(e) has not 
been conducive to the proliferation of "loopholes" through which the sub-
contracting clause can escape an unintended extinction. Furthermore, al-
though an imperfect pardon for the bona fide subcontracting clause has 
been fashioned by the Board, it has been quickly revoked when a clause is 
suspected of being used as a vehicle for effectuating secondary objectives. 
Therefore the task which confronts contemporary draftsmen of subcontract-
ing clauses is to avoid being misunderstood. Although this is relatively easy 
when drafting an unqualified prohibition on subcontracting, management 
frequently finds such a clause intolerable. Thus, at present the real desidera-
tum is a subcontracting clause whose integrity is unimpeachable, yet which 
is sufficiently flexible in its application to accommodate the requirements 
of both labor and management. 
Although these criteria might possibly be met by carefully worded ver-
sions of several of the clauses already discussed, it is submitted that a "share 
the savings" subcontracting clause holds out particular promise of satisfying 
all requisites. This type of clause requires the employer to share with his 
employees whatever savings are realized from subcontracting. The primary 
objectives of such a clause are apparent. It decreases the employer's incen-
tive to subcontract to the extent that he has to surrender the savings to 
his employees, thereby increasing the likelihood that the work will remain 
in the bargaining unit. In addition, the profit received by the bargaining 
unit employees can partially compensate them for loss of work should the 
employer still decide to subcontract. On the other hand, the clause is in-
capable of being used to effectuate a secondary objective because it leaves 
the employer free to deal with any person he wishes, and, as long as he 
retains some part of the realized savings, he will deal with those subcon-
tractors who are most economical, regardless of whether the union has a 
current dispute with them or not. Even if the union were to demand the 
entire realized saving, this would only leave the employer with an indifferent 
attitude toward subcontracting, and it would not influence his choice of 
subcontractors should he nevertheless decide to subcontract the work. 
Finally, such a clause means greater profits to be shared by labor and 
125 NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers, Local 17, 309 F.2d 31, 45 (9th Cir. 1962), 
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963); Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Lithographers, 180 
F. Supp. 294, 305-06 (N.D. Cal. 1960). 
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management because it gives the employer freedom to make his managerial 
decisions on a cost analysis basis. Thus, a "share the profits" clause may be 
used as a highly flexible vehicle for compromising management's desire for 
profit with the union's desire for security during that difficult transitional 
period which accompanies a basic re-allocation of work. 
David M. Ebel 
